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In mid-October, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said that Turkey has the capacity to become an energy hub for natural gas heading to Europe. Although the idea is not new, this time it came in response to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s offer to divert Russian gas deliveries to the European Union (EU) from the damaged Nord Stream gas pipelines to the Black Sea and on to Europe via Turkey.
In a recent interview, Turkish Energy Minister Fatih Donmez doubled down on Ankara’s ambition, saying it would “lay out a roadmap by the end of this year” when it “could hold a conference for suppliers and buyers.”
Turkey’s desire to play a major role in the regional energy infrastructure is not only geopolitically driven but also economically and technically feasible. The country’s location at the intersection of multiple hydrocarbon pipelines, as well as its gas storage capacity, can really help shape the energy landscape for the region. However, to succeed as an energy hub, Russian gas cannot be a key part of the plan.
The basic philosophy of each “energy hub” is based on several pillars: diversification of existing routes and suppliers, independence in decision-making through an independent institution, market demand and supply that determine prices, and political will of potential partners to engage in projects. . The Russian proposal does not fill any of these boxes.
On the contrary, Putin’s idea to make Turkey a Russian gas hub could increase Ankara’s reliance on Russian fossil fuels, deepen its strategic dependence on Moscow in areas far from energy, and further damage Turkey’s already complex relationship with the West.
Cheap gas at a high political price
Turkey has made progress in recent years in reducing gas purchases from Russia, due to an increased share of liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, as well as diversifying its energy mix by including more renewable energy sources. However, it remains heavily dependent on Russian energy supplies: Gazprom has provided 44.9 percent of Turkey’s domestic gas demand in 2021. Turkey also imports between 10 and a third of its crude oil from Russia each year. Turkish imports of Russian oil have risen significantly since the February invasion of Ukraine, doubling in August. According to a new report by the Ukrainian Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies, Turkey became the leading importer of crude oil in Russia in October, followed by Italy and Greece.
Meanwhile, Rosatom is building the Akuyu nuclear power plant on a build-own-operate model in the Mediterranean province of Mersin. There are legitimate fears that this strategic facility—built and owned by a Russian state-owned enterprise, operated by Russian operators in a NATO member state and located near Turkey’s Incirlik Air Base and a Russian military installation in Tartus, Syria—could become the next coin in Moscow’s nuclear blackmail. At the same time, talk of a possible new deal to build a four-reactor plant at Sinop on the Black Sea coast, just across from Ukraine’s Russian-occupied Crimea peninsula, is also raising eyebrows.
Experts warn that this growing dependence on Russian oil, nuclear technologies and gas makes Turkey vulnerable to energy blackmail like Europe experienced through the reduction of Russian gas.
In fact, Turkey is familiar with Moscow’s weapons. By building TurkStream — a gas pipeline connecting Russia to Turkey, bypassing Ukraine — as a geopolitical rather than an economic project, Gazprom has deepened Ankara’s reliance on Moscow and caused tensions in Turkey’s relations with Ukraine.
Earlier this year, Russia announced a ten-day shutdown of the Blue Stream pipeline, which carries about 60 percent of Turkey’s Russian gas imports, with just two days’ notice. Experts say intermittent maintenance disruptions to TurkStream, which supplies the rest of Russia’s gas to Turkey, as well as Putin’s unwarranted claims of expected terrorist attacks on the TurkStream pipeline, could signal tough times for Ankara ahead of this winter, as well as parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for in 2023
Finally, growing energy cooperation between Turkey and Russia exposes Ankara to greater pressure from the EU and the United States due to growing concerns that Russia could use this cooperation to circumvent sanctions. Just a week after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Putin discussed the idea of an “energy hub” and Turkish Finance and Finance Minister Nureddin Nebati reiterated his demand for a discount on Russian gas and a delay in payment for its supplies, a US Treasury Department delegation led by Elizabeth Rosenberg, Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, visited Turkey. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, topics covered during meetings with her counterparts in the Turkish government as well as the business community included “sanctions and export controls imposed on Russia…energy security, anti-money laundering policies, and countering the financing of terrorism.”
Could Turkey become a Russian gas hub?
There are also technical issues, which make the implementation of the deal with Russia problematic. Despite promising rhetoric from the leaders of both countries, Turkey is finding it difficult to import much more Russian gas.
First, BlueStream’s existing capacity—16 billion cubic meters (bcm)—is used to pump gas to meet Turkey’s own domestic needs. Another gas pipeline connecting Turkey to Russia, Turk Stream, has a total capacity of 31.5 billion cubic meters. The first line, with a capacity of 15.75 billion cubic meters, is intended to supply domestic customers in Turkey, while the second line, with the same capacity, transports Russian gas further to Europe via Bulgaria.
These capacities cannot even come close to replacing the 110 billion cubic meters of the two Nord Streams. In addition, this route can — even in theory — feed only the small southern European market of Greece, North Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary, while the main consumers of Russian gas, such as Germany, remain in the north.
Second, building new pipelines in the Black Sea, which is currently a war zone, requires physical security and safety, significant investment, advanced deepwater offshore construction technologies and pipe-laying vessels – all of which are potential targets for new EU sanctions. Russia cannot guarantee the safety of such projects, and Western companies will not be willing to provide investment, technology and insurance. Another big question: how to bring additional quantities of gas from the reservoir to the Russian Black Sea coast?
Third, the EU, now undergoing a major decarbonization transition and disillusioned with Moscow as a credible partner, has little appetite for more Russian gas, whoever the seller is. Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, the EU has reduced Russia’s share of its gas imports to 7.5 percent from 43.5 percent in 2021, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said. During her July visit to Baku, where she signed an agreement to double gas imports from Azerbaijan, she pointed out that “the European Union has decided to diversify away from Russia and turn to more reliable and trustworthy partners.” Any new pipeline carrying Russian gas to EU borders is unlikely to get the green light from Brussels. Instead, it would be doomed to the fate of the South Stream pipeline, which was supposed to transport gas from Russia to several European countries via Bulgaria, but had to be canceled after objections from the EU.
Can Turkey still become an energy center without Russia?
Turkey can still assume the role of a major energy player in the region and offer Europe alternative fossil fuels to fill the Russian gas gap.
However, for this Ankara will have to make a political decision to break away from Moscow and turn to alternative suppliers. Turkey may seek to upgrade the capacity of the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and the Southern Gas Corridor to pump more Azerbaijani and, potentially, Turkmen gas. TANAP’s current transmission capacity is 16 billion cubic meters, with 10 billion cubic meters allocated to Europe and 6 billion cubic meters remaining for the domestic market of Turkey. The recent agreement signed between the European Commission and Azerbaijan will allow this number to double to 32-33 billion cubic meters in the next five years. If Turkmenistan joins the project, further diversification of gas supplies will benefit both Turkey’s energy security and its relations with Europe, reducing the country’s dependence on Russia. The upcoming Turkey-Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan summit in Avaza could bring new positive developments in this direction.
In addition, Turkey could take advantage of gas resources in the eastern Mediterranean by accelerating efforts to reach an agreement with Israel; revive the idea of a Trans-Balkan corridor with Ukraine; explore possibilities for bringing Kurdish gas from northern Iraq; and increase cooperation on LNG with the United States, Qatar and Algeria. It would diversify its energy supply, strengthen Turkey’s position against Russia and help mend ties with the West. Despite the legal, political and technical challenges — which accompany any such project — these options may be worth a try.
Exploration of Turkey’s Sakarya gas field in the Black Sea could potentially supply up to 25 percent of domestic demand after it becomes operational in 2023, with an estimated ten million cubic meters per day. Finally, the development of the nation’s energy infrastructure — from the construction of new LNG terminals and regasification plants to further increases in underground gas storage capacity — will significantly strengthen Turkey’s energy security and its stance toward an increasingly unpredictable Russia.
To achieve these goals, Turkey will need to receive capital investments from international financial institutions, technical assistance from Western companies, and political support from NATO and the EU. European sanctions for increased cooperation with Russia are unlikely to succeed if they are not complemented by viable and attractive alternatives. Its Western partners should clearly demonstrate to Turkey the economic and political benefits of participating in the European energy market. Maintaining Ankara’s engagement in EU regional energy projects and providing the opportunity to invest in the development of its energy infrastructure, based on clear conditionality, could make the proposals of the Russian “hub” less attractive.
For its part, Turkey should wake up to the new reality. Both commercial logic and political wisdom dictate that Europe will no longer be the main market for Russian gas. Exploring the phantom possibilities of energy cooperation with Russia at the expense of real risks of exposure to US and EU sanctions will not transform Turkey into an energy hub. Quite the opposite, it would mean the end of this dream.
Yevgenija Gaber is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY and at Carleton University’s Center for Modern Turkish Studies. Previously, she was a foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister of Ukraine. Follow her on Twitter @GaberIevgeniia.
Additional reading
Image: The Turkish drilling ship Fatih sails through the Bosphorus, en route to the Black Sea in Istanbul, Turkey, May 29, 2020. Picture taken May 29, 2020. REUTERS/Yoruk Isik
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