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Republicans succeeded in ousting the Democratic leadership of the House of Representatives in these US midterm elections and will take control of the lower chamber early next year. Still, one foreign policy issue that seems to enjoy an unusual bipartisan consensus in Washington is China. While there is some truth to that assessment, there are differences in the China-related issues that each side tends to emphasize. There is also a lot of partisan politics that underlies the consideration and debate about China.
Both sides are struggling to position themselves as the better choice to lead the United States in the face of the Chinese challenge. The Republican primary for the 2024 presidential race will soon begin, and GOP candidates will be competing against each other, seeking to convey to voters their credentials as critics of the Chinese Communist Party. More than 80% of Americans now have unfavorable views of China, but Republican voters express relatively greater concern, reflected in the GOP candidate’s relatively open support for a hawkish China policy.
For both of these reasons, even as the Biden administration continues to take a tough stance on China, Eurasia Group analyst Anna Ashton fully expects the Republican-controlled US Congress to accuse the White House of not being tough enough. We asked her how this might affect US policy towards Beijing.
What is known about China’s views on the expected new board chiefs?
Several key House committees are likely to be led by Republicans who have already distinguished themselves as China hawks. Mike McCaul (R-TKS), chairman-elect of the Foreign Affairs Committee, pushed for more US military support for Taiwan and called for stronger congressional oversight of China’s export controls. Mike Rogers (R-AL), the front-runner to head the Armed Services Committee, called for greater preparation for a Chinese attack on Taiwan and called for the withdrawal of US supply chains from China. Cathy McMorris Rogers (R-VA), the likely new head of the Energy and Commerce Committee, highlighted the risk that green energy solutions will prolong US reliance on China. Finally, the possible next chairmen of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (Sam Graves, MO) and the Natural Resources Committee (Bruce Westerman, AR) joined McMorris Rogers in drawing attention to this problem, urging the US to avoid “reliance on authoritarian regimes for energy “.
Will a small Republican majority result in less pressure on China than if the expected red wave materializes?
While there are significant divisions between House Republicans and Democrats over the approach to China, there is significantly more common ground between House Republicans and Senate Democrats. A slim majority in the House of Representatives does not necessarily mean a bad chance for Republican China proposals in Congress in general. The very slim Republican leadership looks like it could prove a powerful lever for far-right Republicans who want more of a say in House priorities, but members of the Freedom Caucus are not leading voices on China issues. To the extent that they want to influence China’s agenda, they are likely to support attention to issues like the repression of religious freedom and the origins of the COVID virus. But it’s also fair to say that most of these members will be focused on other issues.
What new or existing legislation does he expect the Republican House to pass?
In 2020, Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy created the GOP China Task Force, which later issued a report with more than 300 policy recommendations for Congress and the administration on how to deal with Beijing. Six categories have been common themes in hundreds of proposed bills over the past two Congresses and are likely to continue to be strong themes: ideological competition, supply chain security, national security, technology, the economy, and energy and competitiveness.
The China-related issues that have piqued Republican interest suggest that the 118th Congress may push more aggressively to overhaul America’s longstanding Taiwan policy. The GOP will move to send more high-profile congressional delegations to Taiwan, step up pressure to curb technology export licenses to China and further limit the ability of Chinese companies to access US capital.
The GOP also wants to establish a Select Committee on China, which will hold hearings, conduct investigations and coordinate messaging. Expect hearings focused on Chinese influence on American companies and Chinese influence operations in the United States.
Given the fairly strong anti-China stances of both parties, what are the prospects for cooperation with a Democratic-controlled Senate and White House?
The Senate, under narrow Democratic control, showed strong cooperation on the Chinese legislation, passing the sweeping US-China Innovation and Competition Act, or USICA, in June 2021 with 19 Republican votes in favor. The CHIPS and Science Act that eventually became law is far less comprehensive than USICA — in part because bipartisan cooperation on a wider range of issues has proven impossible. The House is likely to continue to struggle for consensus on many China issues, although both sides may find some common ground on proposals that call out China’s human rights record, improve US competitiveness at home or better protect US security interests.
How is China expected to react and what are the risks of crossing China’s “red lines”?
Generally, when Beijing opts for an official response to US punitive actions, it opts for equal and reciprocal measures. But more common are moves that are not officially reciprocated.
The most significant known red line for China is official US recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty and independence, but this is unlikely to happen under the Biden administration. American efforts to strengthen ties with Taiwan — especially measures that give Taiwan more of the trappings of sovereignty — will provoke strong responses from China. Congressional visits and legislation that appears to give Taiwan more of the trappings of sovereignty could lead to additional military live-fire exercises, sanctions against US officials and reduced cooperation and communication on issues of mutual concern.
Provocations focused on Taiwan, human rights, democracy, or other issues that Beijing views as a matter of sovereignty could prompt China to implement some of its provisions aimed at countering U.S. long-arm jurisdiction — the ability of U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over foreign defendants from China. U.S. efforts to curb China’s technological advances could also eventually provoke strong retaliation, but the two sides are currently seeking to stabilize ties.
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