The danger of deepening the China-Russia axis | Daily News Byte

As Vladimir Putin’s military fortunes wax and wane, China has emerged as a key supporter of Russia. The existence of the Sino-Russian axis was already evident at the Putin-Xi summit on the eve of the 2022 Winter Olympics, after which the leaders issued a joint declaration in which they underlined their countries’ opposition to further NATO expansion.

Xi then made it clear that China and Russia would support each other’s interests and sovereignty as part of “deepening successive strategic coordination.” He attacked “certain countries” that he claimed were trying to impose their standards on other countries – a thinly veiled swipe at the United States – reaffirming the adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

Since the beginning of the war, Beijing has taken important steps to help Russia circumvent sanctions. China has increased its purchases of Russian energy by over 60%, dramatically increasing its reliance on Russia for gas and oil as well as coal. (This year, Russia surpassed Indonesia as China’s top coal supplier.) The shift appears to be motivated by a mixture of self-interest and a strategic desire to prop up the Putin regime; it bought more Russian energy, but at lower prices, helping itself while softening the impact of Western sanctions on its ally. Given that China is the world’s largest importer of crude oil and the second largest importer of natural gas, it will be nearly impossible to isolate Russia as long as Beijing positions itself as the largest buyer.

Xi Jinping has not yet openly defied Western sanctions, in part no doubt because of dire US warnings about the consequences and because — more pressingly — he has more to worry about at home, not least because of growing anger across the country against Covid-related restrictions on everyday freedoms.

However, relations between China and Russia are now extremely close. As long as Putin remains in power and committed to the idea of ​​a global illiberal alliance, while offering his country as a junior but important partner, China will have too good an opportunity to miss.

And this is the bottom line: The United States is not competing with Russia and China on two discrete fronts in Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Instead, it is competing against a new Sino-Russian alliance in which both countries are moving in tandem to threaten the West. The geopolitics of this challenge are frightening, as their alliance raises the prospect that Beijing and Moscow could join forces to lock the United States out of Eurasia. Furthermore, if Russia defeats Ukraine and Germany remains reliant on China as its largest trading partner, we could see conditions in Europe that pose a direct challenge to the United States. This has been China’s clear aim for several years anyway, although the 17+1 format in Central and Eastern Europe has ossified, as its current 16+1 status shows.

This is nevertheless a challenge to the core of American interests. In the last century, the US went to war twice to prevent one country—first imperial and then Nazi Germany—from dominating Europe and Eurasia, which would have trapped the US in the Western Hemisphere. The prospect of such a global power imbalance would threaten not only our future prosperity but the American homeland itself.

And when a Eurasian power seemed poised to dominate all of Europe devastated by Hitler’s quest for empire, the United States committed itself to half a century of containment. We remained in the fight until this challenge was overcome, with the implosion of the Soviet empire ushering in an unprecedented era of peace and prosperity across Europe.

Today, the challenge is greater, as the balance of power, especially when considering the combined resources of the Sino-Russian alliance and the relative lack of military power in Europe, has evened the odds. To gauge the level of risk, at the end of World War II, the United States economy accounted for about half of global GDP, the U.S. Navy was larger than all the navies in the world combined, and the U.S. commanded—albeit fleetingly—an undisputed monopoly on nuclear weapons. . By contrast, today when measured by purchasing power parity (PPP), credible estimates put the US and Chinese economies on par. And while Russia’s economic potential is often dismissed (beyond its energy resources), the Kremlin brings to the Sino-Russian alliance a certain degree of complementarity in areas where China lacks.

So while it is true that China’s vast industrial base is not synonymous with the country’s ability to field state-of-the-art military systems—a capability that takes decades to develop—Russia, for its part, has continued to advance its weapons designs with systems that, if offered to China, could enable its defense industry to become competitive with American systems.

Despite the poor performance of the Russian military in Ukraine, it would be a serious mistake to completely dismiss Russian military might. Since the Cold War, Russia has modernized the design of its attack submarine fleet, its nuclear weapons and its cyber capabilities. If shared with China and mass-produced, this could affect the PRC’s industrial infrastructure and pose a serious threat to the United States and our allies.

Russia and China have cooperated closely on weapons research and development since their 1996 strategic partnership agreement, including direct licensing of post-Soviet systems, such as China’s production of the Russian Su-27Sk Flanker B fighter jet, and other cooperative ventures. Data released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute indicate a symbiotic relationship between the Russian and Chinese defense industries, with Russia supplying radar technology, anti-ship and anti-tank missiles, naval guns, advanced turbofan engine technology, as well as outright purchases. of the most advanced Russian air defense systems S-400. China is increasingly able to innovate on these systems at a rate that surpasses what Russia can do, except for nuclear weapons technology.

It is important to note that since 1996, Russian ship designs have played a key role in building the People’s Liberation Army Navy, which now has more ships (albeit less capable) than its American rival. For decades, Russia has aided China’s military modernization, providing both weapons systems and technology. Over time, China has used its industrial base and access to Western research and development facilities to position itself as a major arms exporter. Today, China ranks sixth out of the world’s 25 largest defense producers, and although its market share is only 5% of global arms sales (Russia’s is 19%), it is already on its way to dominating the bottom market. .

Access to modern Russian weapons design, particularly its cutting-edge systems and submarines, would position China to compete for both the mid- and high-end markets. Moreover, technology transfers from Russia—not unlike those from the West that have followed the PRC’s spectacular economic rise—combined with high-quality Chinese manufacturing processes could revolutionize Beijing’s arms production, short-circuiting current projections of when the People’s Liberation Army and Navy (PLA) and PLAN) could set up truly competitive systems. In short, the Kremlin has it in its power to help the PRC turn itself into an even more formidable military competitor to the United States.

The ongoing consolidation of the Sino-Russian alliance presents an even more immediate challenge when it comes to great power competition, particularly how we conceptualize the theater(s) in which it is played out. In the last decade, the focus in Washington has increasingly been on the Indo-Pacific, with Taiwan’s security and defense a major concern as a pillar of the US-guaranteed Asian security system.

Since the Obama administration announced its “Pivot to Asia” in 2012, much US strategic planning has followed a bifurcated pattern, effectively separating the Pacific and Atlantic theaters. This approach encouraged our force planning in terms of both numbers and structure, leaving the United States with inadequate forces that were poorly structured to engage in both theaters simultaneously.

The deepening Sino-Russian alliance after the war in Ukraine should serve as a warning that once again our pre-war assumptions and planning may not survive contact with reality. As with previous bids for hegemonic control of Eurasia in the 20th century^th century, Europe could become a major battleground if China throws its full weight behind its Russian ally.

We face a conflict that could once again be resolved in Europe because this theater — as in the past — holds the key to controlling Eurasia. We would do well to at least consider and prepare for such a possibility.

Chels Michta is a non-resident fellow in the Democratic Resilience Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Chels is a former member of CEPA Title VIII and is currently a military intelligence officer serving in the US Army.

The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US military, the US Department of Defense, or the US government.