NATO’s Fault Line: China – POLITICS | Daily News Byte

NATO allies finally agreed earlier this year that China is a “challenge.” What that means is anybody’s guess.

That’s the task now facing officials from the 30-member NATO expansion since they settled on the label in June: Turning the endlessly malleable term into a real plan.

Progress so far has been modest—at best.

At one end, China hawks like the US are trying to align NATO’s goals with their own desire to contain Beijing. On the other side are Chinese softliners like Hungary who want to engage Beijing. Then there’s the vast and volatile middle ground: hawks who don’t want to antagonize Beijing too much; soft lines that still worry about economic reliance on China.

US Ambassador to NATO Julien Smith insisted that US and NATO strategies can be compatible.

“I see a tremendous alignment between the two,” she told POLITICO. But, she admitted, translating the words of the alliance into action is “a long and complicated story.”

Indeed, looming over the entire debate is the question of whether China currently deserves so much attention. A war is raging in NATO’s backyard. Russia is not giving up its revanchist ambitions.

“NATO is not meant for operations in the Pacific Ocean — it’s a North Atlantic alliance,” Josep Borrell, the EU’s top diplomat, said in a recent interview with POLITICO.

“Certainly other threats and challenges can be considered,” he added. “But [for] don’t you think that we currently have enough threats and challenges according to the traditional NATO scenario?

The issue will be on the table this week in Bucharest, where foreign ministers from across the alliance will sign a new report on the response to China. Although officials agreed on a few key issues, the talks will offer an overview of tough debates expected to plague NATO for years, especially given China’s expected move to strangle Taiwan — a semi-autonomous island the US has vowed to defend.

“Now,” said one senior European diplomat, “so what” is not easy.

30 allies, 30 opinions

NATO’s label of a “challenge” to China — which came at the annual summit in Madrid — is a seemingly innocuous word that still represented an unprecedented show of Western unity against the rise of Beijing.

In a key part of the alliance’s new strategic plan, the leaders wrote that “we will work together responsibly, as allies, to address the systemic challenges” China poses to the military alliance.

It was, in many ways, a historic moment, foreshadowing NATO’s future and reflecting skillful coordination among the 30 members who have long had very different relationships with Beijing.

The US has led much of the effort to draw NATO’s attention to China, arguing that the alliance must reduce Beijing’s influence, reduce dependence on the Asian power and invest in its own capabilities. A number of allies supported the quest, including Canada, the United Kingdom, Lithuania and the Czech Republic.

China is “the only competitor with the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do so,” the US wrote in its own national security strategy released last month.

But NATO is a broad spectrum alliance. A number of Eastern European countries lean towards these hawks, but want to keep the alliance focused on the Russian threat. Some are wary of angering China and the possibility of pushing Beijing further into Moscow’s arms. Meanwhile, a number of Western European powers are concerned about China’s role in sensitive parts of the Western economy, but still want to maintain economic ties.

Now the job is to turn these different feelings into something usable.

“There is a risk that we debate endlessly about the adjectives we apply here,” said David Querrey, the UK’s ambassador to NATO.

“We’re very focused on practical application,” he told POLITICO in an interview. “I think that’s where the debate needs to go – and I think we’re making progress on that.”

For Quarreio and Smith, the US ambassador, that means forcing NATO to consider several components: building greater protections in cyberspace, a domain China wants to dominate; preparing to thwart attacks on the infrastructure that powers society, a Western vulnerability exposed by Russia; and ensuring that key supply chains do not pass through China.

In addition, Querrey said, NATO must also deepen “even more” its partnerships with regional allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

While NATO allies can probably mostly agree on goals such as strengthening cyber defenses, there is some grumbling about the consequences of the pivot to Asia.

The United States “wants as much China as possible to make NATO relevant to China-centric Washington,” a senior European diplomat said. But, this person added, “it’s not clear where NATO really adds value.”

And Great Britain, the diplomat claims, is putting pressure on NATO on China because it “needs some kind of multilateral framework after Brexit.”

Perhaps most importantly, the turn to China raises existential questions about Europe’s security. Currently, Europe relies heavily on American security guarantees, American troops stationed locally, and American arms suppliers.

“The unspoken truth is that in order to strengthen Taiwan,” a European diplomat said, the US would not be “in a position to become permanently stronger in Europe.”

Europeans, this person said, “must face the music and do more.”

Central compromise

Smith, the US ambassador, understands the different perspectives on China and beyond in NATO.

The upcoming report on China therefore deals with more secure topics, such as critical infrastructure defense. While some diplomats had hoped for a more ambitious report, Smith insisted she was satisfied. The US priority, she said, is to formally start the business.

“We could argue about adjectives and how some of those challenges are described,” she said. But what was most important for the United States was that we were able to get all those workflows in the report.

But even that is a small step for NATO on a long highway. Agreeing to job descriptions and scopes is one thing, but actually doing the job is another.

“We are still not doing much,” said another senior European diplomat. “It’s still a report outlining what areas we need to work on – there’s a lot ahead of us.”

Among the big questions that remain unanswered: How might China integrate into NATO’s defense planning? How would NATO replenish the US support that is currently going to Europe if part of it is diverted to Asia? Will European allies offer Taiwan support in a crisis scenario?

Western capitals’ unrelenting support for Kiev — and the complications the war has created — is also being closely watched as the countries plan for a potential military showdown in the Asia-Pacific region.

Asked last month whether the alliance would respond to the escalation over Taiwan, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told POLITICO that “the main ambition, of course, is to prevent it,” in part by working more closely with partners in the area.

Smith was similarly dismissive when asked about NATO’s role if a full-scale confrontation erupts over Taiwan – a distinct possibility given Beijing’s expressed desire to reunite the island with the mainland.

Instead, Smith pointed to how Pacific nations have supported Ukraine halfway around the world during the current war, saying “European allies have noticed.”

She added: “I think it raises some questions about whether other scenarios would play out in the future, for those Atlantic and Pacific allies to come together again to defend key principles [United Nations] Charter.”

Stuart Lau contributed reporting.